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Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide microlevel
(within-county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover
effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experienced more bank mergers are subjected to higher interest
rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher
property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger-induced
banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and
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tobias.moskowitz@gsb.uchicago.eduWe examine the real and social impact of local credit competition by documenting a link between
the competitiveness of the local banking market, credit conditions, urban development, and crime.
Several recent studies (Peek and Rosengren (2000), Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Klein, Peek, and
Rosengren (2002), and Burgess and Pande (2003)) tie credit market imperfections to diminished
real economic activity and growth. Other studies connect the economic environment to property
crime (Freeman (1999), Levitt (2001), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), and Nilsson (2004)). It
is reasonable to hypothesize, therefore, that reductions in bank competition may lead to economic
decline and, subsequently, increases in property crime. We empirically investigate the eﬀects of
bank consolidation and increased market power on credit availability and real activity using a
unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks in the 1990’s. We provide
micro-level evidence that neighborhoods that experienced greater reductions in bank competition
due to bank mergers are subjected to future higher interest rates, diminished local construction,
lower real estate prices, and an inﬂux of poorer households. We then examine whether these changes
impact the social environment by studying subsequent changes in crime rates across neighborhoods,
and ﬁnd an associated increase in property crime. Importantly, these results do not appear to be
due to reverse causation since, among other evidence, our large bank mergers are not preceded by
or contemporaneously correlated with crime increases or economic declines.
Our empirical strategy employs mergers between banks of at least $1 billion in assets to cap-
ture plausibly exogenous changes in the competitiveness of local banking markets. We consider
only variation at the neighborhood level within counties in banking loan market competitiveness
generated by mergers of non-failing large commercial banks. The size, scope, and health of these
banks makes it unlikely that economic declines in the local neighborhoods we examine are driving
the mergers. We then analyze the local market eﬀects of these mergers on subsequent loan supply,
interest rates, property prices, investment activity, economic and demographic variables, and crime.
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that we only examine the relation between changes in bank
competition through large mergers and changes in economic conditions and crime across neighbor-
hoods. Bank competition cannot explain the aggregate national decline in crime over the last few
decades nor diﬀerences in the level of crime across regions. Indeed, we control for both the time
trend and variation in crime levels across counties in our analysis. This paper merely documents
that changes in local credit market competition, which aﬀect changes in local real activity, have
interesting spillover eﬀects on social outcomes such as crime.
Local ﬁnancial development can be paramount to economic growth even in a well-integrated
1ﬁnancial environment (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004)). The market for small commercial real
estate loans is localized due to information and agency considerations (Garmaise and Moskowitz
(2003, 2004)). For these reasons, merger-induced changes in the local competitive environment
can have sizeable eﬀects. We ﬁnd that when loan competition declines (via large bank mergers),
interest rates charged on loans rise signiﬁcantly and borrowers receive smaller loans from banks.1
These ﬁndings also control for bank-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, indicating that the same bank is setting
diﬀerent loan terms in areas with diﬀerent levels of competition. It is important to note, however,
that these mergers lead to short-term distortions in the loan market. In the longer-term, entry
of new banks and increased loan supply by existing banks should lead to a restored competitive
equilibrium (Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998)). Consistent with this notion, we show
that mergers’ impact on the local competitive environment lasts about three years, ceasing to have
any signiﬁcant eﬀe c to nc r e d i to rl o a nt e r m sb e y o n dt h i st i m e .
It is during this short-term distortion of the local loan market that large banking mergers have
substantial real economic implications. We ﬁnd that commercial real estate development, which is
often a marginal investment for banks, and new construction activity fall signiﬁcantly. In addition,
local property prices decline. Examining local demographic and migration data from the census,
we then ﬁnd that unemployment in the area rises, median income drops, and income inequality
increases. Moreover, the income of new arrivals into the neighborhood is below that of long-term
residents, suggesting an exodus (inﬂux) of higher (lower) income households in response to the local
decline in property values.
These changing economic and demographic characteristics provide a plausible channel through
which crime may rise. In particular, we ﬁnd subsequent increases in burglary and, more broadly,
property crimes in these areas. There appears to be, however, no signiﬁcant increase in homicide
or other personal crimes, which have a tenuous relation with economic activity. It is a general
conclusion of the crime literature that economic decline is linked closely to property crime but
loosely, if at all, to personal/violent crime (see Levitt (2001), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001),
and Nilsson (2004)). Our results are consistent with bank mergers leading to economic deterioration,
which in turn results in more property crime, but has no deﬁnite eﬀect on violent crime. We ﬁnd
that the elasticity of property crime risk with respect to merger-induced bank concentration is 0.18.
The crime literature reports elasticities of crime with respect to direct economic variables such as
wages and unemployment in the range of 0.6 to 0.9, (Grogger (1998), Rickman and Witt (2003)),
1Although several empirical studies have examined the eﬀects of bank mergers on loan markets, most analyze
aggregate market data. An exception is Sapienza (2002), who provides evidence on individual loan contracts.
2so the magnitude of the elasticity we ﬁnd suggests an indirect eﬀe c to fc r e d i tm a r k e tt e r m so n
property crime via economic mechanisms. The eﬀect on crime itself is small, but clearly important
to local residents. Applying our results to national crime ﬁgures from the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports, the mean decline in banking competitiveness due to mergers from 1992 to 1995 that we
document is associated with approximately 24,300 more property crime oﬀenses over the period
1995 to 2000 across the U.S.
We also ﬁnd that the diﬀerential eﬀect of mergers on property crime risks varies across neigh-
borhoods. Areas that already have high banking concentration and low median income are more
severely aﬀected by a merger-induced reduction in loan competition. This suggests that the real
and social costs of bank mergers can be much higher in fragile neighborhoods.
While we believe that this body of evidence suggests a plausible causal (though indirect) link
from bank mergers to crime, a natural alternative theory for these results is reverse causation.
In considering the hypothesis that future crime increases are in some way prompting present-day
mergers, we ﬁrst note that commercial real estate loans are only a small part of banks’ portfolios
and, in any case, the future price eﬀects we ﬁnd correlated with mergers are small. In addition, we
consider only the mergers of non-failing, large (more than $1 billion in assets) banks, which almost
certainly are not driven by the possibility of future neighborhood-level declines. Nonetheless, we
investigate the hypothesis that some unobservable economic variables that aﬀect future crime also
motivate present-day bank mergers.
Evidence against this alternative hypothesis is summarized in the following set of results. First,
we ﬁnd that while bank mergers antedate economic deterioration and increases in crime, economic
decline and increases in crime are not correlated with either contemporary or future bank mergers.
Second, while we employ only non-failing banks for our merger variable, as a robustness test we
also compute a change in concentration measure from the mergers of failing banks only, since
these are the most likely to be associated with economic declines in the neighborhoods in which
they operate. We ﬁnd, however, that mergers between failing banks do not predict future crime
increases. While diﬃcult to reconcile with reverse causation, this ﬁnding is consistent with mergers
aﬀecting competition, since the removal of a failing bank from the market probably has only a
small competitive eﬀect. Third, we also examine changes in the number of non-lending ﬁnancial
institutions such as insurance companies and securities brokers. These institutions, like banks,
are aﬀected by the current and past local economic environment, but unlike banks they should
have no impact on local credit conditions. Consistent with this, we ﬁnd no association between
3consolidation of non-lending institutions and future crime, failing to support reverse causation.
Finally, when we consider mergers that should not aﬀect the local competitive environment, for
example when outsider banks acquire insider banks, such mergers do not predict changes in credit
conditions or increases in future crime. This collection of results suggests the reverse causation
theory is not very plausible.
Although our analysis focuses on neighborhood variation in economic activity and crime, we also
examine county and state level variation that employ additional variables of interest. At the county
level, we obtain additional construction and crime statistics and show that increased bank mergers
predict reduced construction activity and higher burglary rates, but again do not predict increased
homicide rates. At the state level, we also employ another measure of bank competition using
variation in state deregulation of bank branching. Branching deregulation had the opposite eﬀect
of mergers by improving credit competition. Consistent with this, in years immediately following
deregulation of branching restrictions within a state, we ﬁnd decreases in banking concentration,
loan rate reduction, increasing loan sizes, rising property prices, and declining burglary rates, with
no eﬀect on homicide. These ﬁndings are consistent with our neighborhood-level results and the
link between credit conditions, economic activity, and property crime.
Our ﬁndings relate to the literature on the real eﬀects of credit market imperfections.2 They are
also broadly consistent with the literature on ﬁnance and development that suggests that a large
ﬁnancial sector is critical for fostering growth.3 Complementing this literature, we provide micro-
level evidence of neighborhood credit markets within the U.S. having important impacts on local
real activity. We further provide novel evidence on spillovers from credit market competitiveness
to social outcomes such as crime. More broadly, the potential connection between ﬁnance, real
activity, and social outcomes is an intriguing area of further study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I details the commercial loan data, crime
data, construction and census data, and bank merger activity used to examine the real and social
eﬀects of ﬁnancial access. Section II describes the empirical strategy we employ to exogenously
2In a cross-country comparison, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) ﬁnd that concentrated banking industries depress
growth. Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) show that the declining position of
Japanese banks in the 1990’s led to signiﬁcant reductions in construction activity and foreign direct investment in the
U.S. Hancock and Wilcox (1997) demonstrate that the capital crunch of the early 1990’s signiﬁcantly reduced both
commercial and residential real estate construction and sales. Black and Strahan (2002) and Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996) show that new business incorporations and income growth followed U.S. branching deregulation. Burgess and
Pande (2003) ﬁnd evidence that the rural bank branch expansion program in India from 1977 to 1990 lowered rural
poverty and increased non-agricultural output.
3King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that
ﬁnancial development is important for real growth across countries and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) ﬁnd
that local ﬁnancial development is a key determinant of local economic success within Italy.
4measure changes in banking competitiveness through large bank mergers. Section III analyzes the
impact of a decrease in bank competition (through mergers) on subsequent loan rates and supply,
economic and demographic variables, and crime risks. Section IV provides further evidence on the
exogeneity of the bank merger variable and tests alternative theories such as reverse causation.
Section V conducts county and state level analysis employing state deregulation of bank branching
as another instrument for competition. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
I. Data and Summary Statistics
We brieﬂy describe the variety of data sources used in the paper.
A. Transaction level data from the U.S. commercial real estate market
Our sample consists of 22,642 commercial real estate transactions drawn from across the U.S.
over the period January 1, 1992 to March 30, 1999 from COMPS.com, a leading provider of
commercial real estate sales data. COMPS collects data on commercial real estate transactions
by contacting buyers, sellers, and brokers, and then conﬁrms their reports with each of these
parties. Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003a, 2003b) provide an extensive description of the COMPS
database and detailed summary statistics. The data span 11 states: California, Nevada, Oregon,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, Texas, Georgia, New York, Illinois, and Colorado, plus the
District of Columbia.
Properties are grouped into three mutually exclusive types: apartments (deﬁned as multi-family
dwellings, apartment complexes, condominiums, and townhouses), vacant land, and commercial
and industrial buildings. Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics on the properties in our
sample. The average (median) sale price is $2.4 million ($600,000). The majority of transacted
properties are relatively small, though values range from $20,000 to $750 million, and there are
only 42 transactions involving REITS (less than 0.2 percent of the sample). Capitalization rates,
deﬁned as net income on the property divided by sale price, and property age are also reported.
The mean, median, standard deviation, and extreme one percentiles are reported to gauge outliers.
Perhaps the greatest strength of the COMPS database, however, is the detailed information
about speciﬁc property transactions. In particular, the data are well detailed with regard to prop-
erty location, identity and location of market participants, and ﬁnancial structure. For example,
COMPS provides eight digit latitude and longitude coordinates of the property’s location (accurate
to within 10 meters). From these, we construct characteristics of the local market in which each
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census statistics at as ﬁne a level as the census block group.
A.1 Financial structure and terms
The COMPS data contain detailed ﬁnancing information for each property transaction. We focus
on the terms of the loan contract, including interest rates, and the size and presence of bank loans.
As Panel A of Table 1 indicates, the average loan size as a fraction of sale price is over 75 percent
a n de v e nt h eﬁrst percentile of properties with loans have at least 20 percent loan-to-value. The
data also contain rich detail on loan terms. Of the 12,937 deals involving debt, 8,573 (roughly 2/3)
have information about the interest rate charged on those loans. Panel A shows that annualized
loan rates average 8.28 percent over the entire sample and rates range from 5 to 11.75 percent per
annum. Other details of the loan contract documented are the maturity of the loan, whether the
loan rate is ﬂoating or ﬁxed, whether amortized and the length of amortization, and whether the
loan was subsidized by the Small Business Administration (only 1.3 percent of loans).
Panel B of Table 1 describes the subset of loans that are made by identiﬁable banks (for some
loans the source is not identiﬁed and other loans are made by insurance companies, investment
banks, or other ﬁnancial institutions). We identify 769 distinct banks making loans in our sample.
Of these, we classify 210 “large banks” as those having at least $1 billion in assets. It is the mergers
among these large banks that we employ as our instrument for competition. Large banks made
5,092 loans, comprising 60 percent of the total number of loans, but tended to make larger loans
on average, comprising more than 74 percent of debt ﬁnancings on a dollar basis.
B. Bank merger activity
Since we employ mergers between large banks as an instrument for changes in bank competition
in the local area (discussed in detail in the next section), we report summary statistics on bank
merger and acquisition activity over our sample period in Panel B of Table 1. Information on bank
mergers is obtained from the Commercial Bank Database of the Federal Reserve. Information on
bank high holding companies (used to track asset levels and acquisitions) is obtained from the Call
Report Database (Reports of Condition and Income data) of the Federal Reserve System, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency.
We include only the following types of mergers and acquisitions in our study:
1. Bank mergers (i.e., combinations in which one FDIC certiﬁcate is surrendered) between two
6banks each with at least $1 billion in assets on the quarter-end preceding the merger. The
merger must be classiﬁed as “non-failing”4 and cannot be between two banks owned by the
same bank holding company.
2. Bank acquisitions in which a high holding company owning banks with total assets of at least
$1 billion in assets acquires a bank with at least $1 billion in assets. The acquired bank must
have been previously owned by a diﬀerent high holding company or by no holding company.
The acquired bank retains its FDIC certiﬁcate.
Of the 769 diﬀerent banks making loans in our sample, 316 were involved in a merger or
acquisition at some point during the period 1992 to 1999. Of the 210 large banks in our sample,
80 were involved in mergers and acquisitions that met the two criteria listed above. The large
number of mergers and acquisitions over our sample period is critical for our empirical strategy to
identify exogenous changes in bank competition. Examples of mergers and acquisitions included
and excluded from our study are given in Table A1 of the appendix. An example of the ﬁrst type
of included union is the merger between Wells Fargo and First Interstate Bankcorp in April-June,
1996. The various banks owned by the First Interstate holding company were merged with Wells
Fargo, and the acquired banks gave up their FDIC certiﬁcates. An example of the second type of
included combination is the acquisition of First Chicago by the National Bank of Detroit (NBD
Bank). The holding company that had previously owned NBD purchased First Chicago and the
name of the holding company was changed to First Chicago NBD Corp. Both NBD Bank and
First Chicago retained their separate FDIC certiﬁcates. For simplicity, we will henceforth refer
to mergers as only those that meet the criteria above. Table A1 also gives examples of mergers
involving “failing” banks, mergers between two banks in the same holding company, and mergers
involving banks with less than $1 billion in assets. These mergers are all excluded, though we will
employ them for “placebo” tests and tests of alternative theories later.
We selected our merger inclusion criteria to minimize the possibility that any association we ﬁnd
between bank mergers and subsequent worsening of credit terms, reduction in local real activity,
and increase in crime is driven by endogenous factors such as forecasted neighborhood changes. We
include only those mergers that are least likely to be driven by concerns over local decline: mergers
between very large, non-failing banks. These banks not only comprise a signiﬁcant fraction of loans
in the sample, but are making loans across a wide geographic area both in our sample (across all 12
4“Non-failing” mergers are those not requiring assistance from the FDIC, RTC, NCUA, state, or other regulatory
agencies.
7states, 38 counties, and 881 zip codes) and more generally across the U.S. From Call Report data we
estimate that the average large bank in our sample has $5.84 billion in assets and has 16,804 branch
oﬃces in 41 states, 949 counties, and 6,644 diﬀerent zip codes. Given their size and geographic
diversity it seems unlikely that local economic conditions of the small neighborhoods (within county)
we examine could be driving the mergers between these large institutions. Nevertheless, we will
investigate this particular hypothesis in Section IV. Mergers within a bank holding company are
excluded because they are unlikely to have signiﬁcant competitive eﬀects. In section IV we provide
evidence that large bank mergers serve as a valid instrument for future bank market competition.
C. Crime data
We augment our sample with crime risk data from CAP Index, Inc. CAP Index computes the
crime score index for a particular location by combining geographic, economic, and population
data with local police, victim, and loss reports. Speciﬁcally, data from police reports, the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Report (UCR), client loss reports, and oﬀender and victim surveys are combined
to form a crime score. The combination of crime risk information from several sources allows for a
richer and more geographically reﬁned measure of crime than can be provided by the FBI’s UCR,
for instance.5 CAP Index supplies crime scores to businesses looking to relocate or banks seeking
automated teller machine locations. We match each property’s eight digit latitude and longitude
coordinates with the crime score index for those coordinates. Hence, we obtain a property speciﬁc
crime score, rather than a county average or coarser crime rate. This is particularly useful since
we can match crime risks with particular property transactions and therefore particular ﬁnancing
characteristics associated with those transactions. However, we also recognize that crime scores
of individual properties will be highly correlated within an area and deal with this issue in our
econometric analysis.
The crime scores measure the probability that a certain crime will be committed in a given
location relative to national and county levels of crime. For example, a crime score of 1 means that
the likelihood of a particular crime being committed is the same in the location as the national
(or county) average for that year. Crime scores range from 0.1 to 20. CAP Index scores the seven
crimes listed in the FBI’s UCR as Part 1 Oﬀenses: homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
5For example, UCR data are typically at the county or city level. Hence, a property on the south side of Chicago
would have the same crime rate as one downtown, which would have the same score as any city in Cook county. CAP
Index scores oﬀe rw i d ev a r i a t i o ni nc r i m er i s k sw i t h i nac i t ya n de v e nw i t h i nn e i g h b o r h o o d s . F o re x a m p l e ,f o rt h e
60610 zip code (downtown Chicago), our data provide 44 diﬀerent burglary risk scores for the year 2000. While these
scores are highly correlated, they provide additional micro-level variation over UCR crime rates.
8burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The ﬁrst four are classiﬁed as “crimes against persons”
and the last three as “crimes against property.” An index of personal crime and property crime,
which are averages of the respective crime scores in those categories, is also reported. We consider
two speciﬁc crime scores, homicide and burglary, as well as the two general crime indices, personal
crimes and property crimes. CAP Index provided crime scores at three points in time: 1990, 1995,
and 2000. We examine the changes in crime risk over the two periods before and after 1995.
Panel C of Table 1 indicates that crime risks are on average higher than the national average
(i.e., greater than 1) in the locations covered by the COMPS database. This is not surprising since
COMPS covers commercial markets which are weighted toward larger cities and more metropoli-
tan/populated areas. As the table indicates, however, there is substantial variation in crime risks
across the property locations covered by COMPS.
We also supplement our analysis with county and state level crime rate data from the FBI’s UCR
for robustness. As Panel C of Table 1 indicates, the correlation between the nationally adjusted
Cap Index crime score and county level UCR crime rates is fairly high (0.37 for homicides and 0.56
for burglaries in 2000). However, the county-adjusted Cap Index scores are virtually uncorrelated
with UCR county crime rates, providing ﬁner geographic variation in crime within counties.
D. Census and construction data
Finally, we supplement our sample with census statistics on income distribution, median housing
value, unemployment, and population at the census tract level and construction data from F.W.
Dodge Division of the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. at the county level. The census data come
from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. We match the
characteristics of each census tract to those properties that reside within it using the latitude
and longitude coordinates. The construction data from F.W. Dodge are annual statistics on new
construction by county over the period 1990 to 2000. Statistics on total construction value (in
$1,000) and total construction units are provided.
II. Using Bank Mergers to Measure Exogenous Competition Changes
We would like an exogenous measure of banking competition that is otherwise unrelated to any of
our dependent variables: demand for ﬁnancing, ﬁnancing terms, prices, measures of real activity,
and crime. Measuring changes in bank competition for commercial loans directly (e.g., changes in
the concentration of bank market share with respect to commercial real estate loans) within a given
9area may be problematic since it is likely that the competitive environment will vary simultaneously
with the performance of local real assets and activity. For instance, a decline in a district’s property
values might lead some banks to withdraw from lending activity in the now less proﬁtable area.
Such endogeneity problems will lead to inconsistent coeﬃcient estimates.
One approach to addressing the endogeneity problem is to satiate the regression with as many
local market and property attributes as is available. We will add a set of controls which attempt
to do this. In addition, we will employ lagged measures of competition to avoid simultaneity
problems. However, unobservable diﬀerences in local real estate market conditions and property
characteristics can also cause endogeneity problems that make detection of an eﬀect diﬃcult in
the data. Therefore, we focus on identifying exogenous variation in banking competitiveness and
employing instrumental variables techniques.6
A. Banking market mergers and acquisitions
We use non-failing, large commercial bank merger and acquisition activity to measure changes in
bank competition that are otherwise uncorrelated with subsequent neighborhood-level variation
in loan rates, prices, investment, and crime. As argued earlier, the size and scope of the banks
involved in these mergers makes it unlikely that local economic trends are motivating the mergers.
Furthermore, Rhoades (2000) documents that mergers and acquisitions are the dominant source of
changes in banking structure from 1980 to 1998 as the number of new chartered banks and bank
failures is considerably smaller than the number of mergers and acquisitions and accounts for less
than 2 percent of local market deposits.
For each property, we compute a measure of bank competition using a local bank loan Herﬁndahl
concentration index. More competitive bank markets are those with lower Herﬁndahl measures.7
We then consider the eﬀects of bank mergers and acquisitions on these Herﬁndahl measures. As
we discuss in Section II.B, the local nature of the commercial real estate market dictates that the
local (to be deﬁned shortly) bank concentration index is the relevant measure.
For any given property, j, irrespective of the date at which it was sold, we ﬁrst calculate for each
6Another approach is to use property ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation to diﬀerence out the unobservables, which assumes
the unobservable eﬀects are constant through time. However, since we do not have panel data in the sense that
almost no properties appear multiple times in our sample, this is not possible.
7Our variable is similar to those used in the literature. Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) examine the
eﬀect of bank mergers and acquisitions on small business lending, using bank mergers as a proxy for bank competition.
Sapienza (2002) also employs bank mergers on a sample of Italian banks and examines the impact on loan contracts.
Other studies that examine the link between merger activity and banking competitiveness are Akhavein, Berger,
and Humphrey (1997), Berger and Hannan (1989), Prager and Hannan (1998), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), and
Walraven (1997). For evidence that more concentrated banking markets are less competitive, see Berger, Demsetz,
and Strahan (1999), Hannan (1997), and Berger, Rosen, and Udell (2001).
























where N(j,yr,b) is the set of properties within 15 miles of property j (excluding the property itself)
which received a loan from bank b during year yr,a n dBj,yr is the set of distinct banks who made
loans to a property within a 15 mile radius of property j in year yr.
We then compute a second measure of bank loan concentration BankHI
merge
j,yr using the merger
activity data for large, non-failing banks. Speciﬁcally, we recompute equation (1) assuming that
all bank mergers that took place during the course of year yr actually occurred at the beginning of
the year. This creates a hypothetical local bank concentration measure that treats future merged
b a n k sa sas i n g l ee n t i t yin their previous deals. That is, if two banks merge during the year, we
examine all of their deals before the merger and code them as coming from the same bank in that
year. For example, if banks A and B merge in June 1994, we code all deals ﬁnanced by A or B
from January to June as coming from the same bank. We are thus measuring the hypothetical
impact on banking concentration based on previous loans made before the merger and assuming
that other banks do not change their market shares after the merger. Our measure underestimates
the eﬀect of the merger since the activity of the merged bank from June to December is included
in BankHIactual
j,yr , thus ignoring the actual decrease in competition caused by the merger ex post.
The predicted change in banking competitiveness from year yr1 to yr2 caused by mergers,











Larger diﬀerences between BankHImerge and BankHIactual across properties (regions) indicate
a more substantial potential impact on local commercial real estate loan competition from bank
mergers. The range of years we use in calculating ∆BankHIyr1:yr2,j varies across our diﬀerent tests.
For example, since crime risks are available in 1990, 1995, and 2000, we compute ∆BankHI1992:1995,j
to determine the eﬀect of bank mergers from 1992 to 1995 on the subsequent crime increase from
1995 to 2000. To determine the eﬀect of mergers on rates of loans used to ﬁnance individual sales,
however, we calculate ∆BankHI1992:saleyear,j,w h e r esaleyear is the year in which the jth property
11transacted. We employ the same measure when examining the impact on property prices as well.
Finally, since census data are only available in 1990 and 2000, we also compute ∆BankHI1992:1999,j
to examine the impact on census statistics such as income distribution.
Figure 1 reports summary statistics on ∆BankHI measures for various horizons. Focusing
on the measure for the whole sample from 1992 to 1999, the mean and standard deviation of
∆BankHI1992:1999 are 0.0048 and 0.0068, respectively. Treating all banks equally, a mean plus one
standard deviation increase in ∆BankHI1992:1999 translates into a decrease in the number of banks
in a local area due to mergers of large banks from an average of 17 to 14. Figure 1, which plots the
histogram of ∆BankHI measures indicates, however, that the majority of local banking markets
experience little or no change in concentration, while a few experience substantial increases. The
90th percentile reduction in the number of banks is 5, which is fairly substantial. The reduction is
even more severe for the fraction of markets most aﬀected by mergers. Such changes can have large
marginal eﬀects on loan competition in a local area. Our results are primarily driven by these few
areas and we will highlight the characteristics of these areas in the next section. Similar measures
are reported in Figure 1 for ∆BankHI1992:1995 and ∆BankHI1992:saleyear, both of which generate
smaller but still sizable changes in banking concentration, particularly in the most extreme areas.
It is worth noting that our study diﬀers from much of the existing literature on U.S. banking
competition, in that we make use of a loan-based Herﬁndahl rather than the more commonly
adopted deposit-based measures of concentration. In considering the terms of commercial real
estate loans and the eﬀects of those terms on real and social outcomes, a loan-based Herﬁndahl
allows for the most direct analysis of the concentration of the local market for bank debt. While the
overlap between local deposit-taking institutions and local loan-making institutions is substantial,
it is not complete. For example, the correlation between our loan-based concentration measure
and the deposit-concentration measure (calculated at the county-level using data from the FDIC’s
summary of deposits) in 1995 is 0.39 (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level). Outside banks can be
quite active in making loans, and banks with sizable local deposits may invest in other sectors of
the market. Our loan-based measure also allows us to consider within-county variation in banking
market concentration.
B. What is the size of the local banking market?
The standard deﬁnition of the local banking market in the literature is the local Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) or non-MSA county (e.g., Prager and Hannan (1998), Berger, Demsetz,
12and Strahan (1999), Rhoades (2002), and Black and Strahan (2002)). As described above, we
deﬁne the local banking market to consist of the 15 mile radius around a property, and in much of
our empirical analysis we include county ﬁxed eﬀects. Our deﬁnition of the local banking market
is ﬁner than that usually employed and requires some explanation.
First, there is evidence from survey data for households and small businesses that banking
markets are highly localized even within counties (see Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and Wolken (1997)
and Petersen and Rajan (2002)). Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and Wolken (1997), for example, show
that the median and 75th percentile of the distances between small businesses and the ﬁnancial
institutions providing their mortgage loans are 4 and 12 miles, respectively. This suggests that
ad e ﬁnition of a local banking market that is narrower than the MSA-level or non-MSA-county-
level is appropriate. Part of the rationale for the standard deﬁnition of a local banking market
is data availability, and our highly detailed data allow us to explore within-county variability in
credit conditions. It is possible, however, to use a banking market deﬁnition that is too ﬁne. For
example, it is unreasonable to suggest that ﬁrms ignore banks located more than ﬁve miles away.
The survey data and previous research in commercial real estate loan markets suggest that 15 miles
is an appropriate choice of radius (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004).
Second, a principal advantage of our neighborhood-level variable is that we are able to include
county ﬁxed eﬀects in our regressions. One might imagine many reasons for credit terms to evolve
diﬀerently in diﬀerent counties (e.g., county or state-level regulatory changes), and our county ﬁxed
eﬀects net out these eﬀects. In addition, it is much less plausible that billion dollar or larger bank
mergers are driven by neighborhood-level changes in the economic environment within a county
giving us greater conﬁdence in the exogeneity of our merger-induced concentration variable.8
Third, for comparability with the previous literature, in Section V we consider county- and
state-level measures and ﬁnd very similar results. In addition, in unreported regressions, we ﬁnd
that our results are robust to using a local banking market radius of either 10, 20, or 25 miles.
III. Bank Mergers’ Impact on Financial, Real, and Social Activity
In this section we examine the subsequent impact on ﬁnancial, real, and social activity from re-
stricted credit access as a result of decreased bank competition from large mergers.
8It is interesting to note that our results are considerably strengthened when we discard the county controls.
13A. Loan rates and borrowing activity
We begin by analyzing in Table 2 how the predicted change in bank Herﬁndahl concentration mea-
sure generated through non-failing, large bank mergers is linked to actual future loan concentration,
rates, terms, and loan size of the property-speciﬁct r a n s a c t i o n si no u rs a m p l e .
In our ﬁrst test, we show that bank mergers do have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on subsequent
actual changes in banking market concentration. In the ﬁrst column of Table 2 we display the results
from regressing the actual change in the local banking market Herﬁndahl index from the ﬁrst to the
second half of our sample (from 1992 to 1995 to 1996 to 1999) on the merger predicted concentration
measure, ∆BankHI1992:1995, and a set of control variables that include the 1995 property crime
index risk and recent growth in crime (from 1990 to 1995), local price variation, deﬁned as the
cross-sectional variation of capitalization rates on all properties within 15 miles of the property
(excluding the property itself), as well as growth in population, income, and median home value
from 1990 to 2000 for the census tract in which the property resides. A constant and ﬁxed eﬀects for
property type and county are also included. Regressions are run under OLS with robust standard
errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level.9 We ﬁnd that ∆BankHI1992:1995
strongly predicts increased bank loan concentration over the subsequent three year period. This
indicates that bank mergers make the local market less competitive over the following three years,
justifying their use as an instrument for market concentration.
The eﬀects of bank mergers on local loan market conditions are analyzed in columns two through
four of Table 2. We regress the interest rates on loans being made on ∆BankHI1992:saleyear and all
the controls from the ﬁrst regression. We also include a set of loan attributes as regressors: the loan-
to-value ratio, indicator variables for ﬂoating or ﬁxed rates, whether the loan is backed by the Small
Business Administration, and the length of amortization and loan maturity in years. In addition,
we add year and bank ﬁxed eﬀects to the regression (for all banks, not just large banks) in order to
measure deviations in loan rates from the average rate charged by a particular lender in a particular
year. This will control for unobservable quality diﬀerences or lending practices across banks as well
as time eﬀects. The second column of Table 2 reports results from the loan rate regression. As
the table indicates, when bank mergers increase the concentration of the local banking market
the increase in loan rates is statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Thus, given the bank ﬁxed
eﬀects, the same bank is charging higher rates in less competitive areas than elsewhere.
9The number of clusters is reported at the bottom of the table along with the total number of observations. For
column 1 this means that although there are 22,317 data points, we are treating the data as if there are only 1,147
independent observations, resulting in conservative standard errors.
14To gauge economic signiﬁcance, we consider the distribution of ∆BankHI1992:saleyear over all
data points for which ∆BankHI1992:saleyear is positive, since the large fraction of the data for which
there is no predicted change in concentration (e.g., ∆BankHI1992:saleyear =0 )i su n i n f o r m a t i v e
about the eﬀects of mergers on loan terms. To assess economic signiﬁc a n c ew ec o n s i d e ro n l yt h e
conditional variation in ∆BankHI1992:saleyear that remains once the variation explained by the
ﬁxed eﬀects is removed. An increase from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile in this residual
variation is 0.0122, which translates into raising average loan rates at the margin by 40.1 basis
points per annum or a 5 percent increase over the mean loan rate of 8.1%. The magnitude of
this price eﬀect associated with an increase in market concentration is consistent with previous
results in the literature (Hannan (1997) and Sapienza (2002)).10 An increase of 40.1 basis points in
loan rates likely discourages investment and may forestall projects. This suggests that the broader
eﬀects of mergers on local economic environments are likely to be most important in areas that
experience the most extreme concentration increases.
Increases in bank concentration aﬀect not only the price of credit, but its quantity as well.
In Column 3 we estimate the probability of obtaining any bank debt using a linear probability
model with the ﬁxed eﬀects and standard errors clustered at the zip code level.11 As Column 3
indicates, borrowers appear to receive bank ﬁnancing less frequently when banking markets become
less competitive, although this result is not statistically signiﬁcant (t-statistic = −1.60). However,
our data do not allow us to account for borrowers who are discouraged by credit conditions and
deterred from seeking loans at all. Column 4 reports results from the regression of the magnitude
of bank debt as a fraction of the purchase price on ∆BankHI1992:saleyear. The amount of bank
debt signiﬁcantly decreases when bank competition declines.12 A 90th percentile increase in the
conditional variation of concentration reduces the amount of bank debt by 2.5 percent.
A.1 Value-weighted concentration measures
The concentration measure we analyze in Panel A is the one described in equation (1): a variable
that equal-weights all loan transactions. We adopt an equal-weighting approach because it is likely
10The literature ﬁnds that mergers between small banks can beneﬁt borrowers (Peek and Rosengren (1998), Strahan
and Weston (1998), Sapienza (2002)), while Peek and Rosengren (1998) and Sapienza (2002) ﬁnd evidence of market
power eﬀects when large banks are acquired. Since we focus on large bank mergers, our results seem in line with
previous evidence.
11We have also employed conditional logit and the robust semiparametric estimators of Klein and Spady (1993).
Since the results from these models were qualitatively similar and generated the same conclusions for the paper, we
only report the OLS estimation results for brevity.
12Since borrowers can substitute cash or seller ﬁnancing for bank debt, some of the dependent variable’s observations
are zero. A truncated regression (Cragg, 1971) yielded coeﬃcient estimates similar to the OLS results reported.
15that small loans, which are typically serviced by local banks, will be most aﬀected by merger-
induced increases in local market concentration. Indeed, we provide evidence in support of this
hypothesis below. As a robustness check, however, in Panel B of Table 2 we report regressions of
future banking market concentration and loan characteristics on a value-weighted merger-induced
concentration measure. As shown in Panel B, the value-weighted results are essentially parallel to
the equal-weighted results and provide additional evidence that large bank mergers have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on future loan terms. Since results are similar using either measure, for brevity we report
results for the equal-weighted measure throughout the paper.
A.2 Short-term distortions and long-term equilibrium
Consistent with the results in Panels A and B, Sapienza (2002) ﬁnds that after mergers, banks
engage in less small business lending. Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) and Berger,
Bonime, Goldberg, and White (2000), however, show that merged banks’ competitors increase
their small business lending in response so that the net eﬀect on small business lending is unclear.
We can reconcile these ﬁndings with our results by considering the timing of our transactions. We
measure the eﬀect of the change in competition on loan rates over the period 1992 to the sale year
of the property. On average this is a 3.5 year period. We posit that a change in the regulatory or
technological environment motivates two banks to merge. This merger then aﬀects the competitive
environment and results in higher loan rates and smaller loans being provided. This short-term
distortion of the market will typically provoke entry or loan supply increases by competing banks,
but as Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) note, these competitive eﬀects will require a
minimum of three years to be realized. In the interim, the loan market perform ineﬃciently with
a diminished level of ﬁnancing, and this is the eﬀect we are capturing.
To test this idea in our sample, in Panel C Column 1 of Table 2 we regress the change in bank
c o n c e n t r a t i o nf r o m1 9 9 8t o1 9 9 9o np r e d i c t e dc h a n g e si nc o n c e n t r a t i o nd u et om e r g e r s4t o6y e a r s
ago (∆BankHI1992:1994)a n dd u et om e r g e r si nt h em o s tr e c e n tt h r e ey e a r s( ∆BankHI1995:1997).
The 1998 to 1999 period is the only one for which a six year precursor period is available. All of the
previous control variables are also included in the regression. Merger-induced increases in banking
concentration over the most recent prior three years lead to an increase in actual concentration: the
coeﬃcient on ∆BankHI1995:1997 is signiﬁcantly positive. Increases from the more distant three year
p e r i o d ,h o w e v e r ,l e a dt odecreases in actual concentration: the coeﬃcient on ∆BankHI1992:1994 is
signiﬁcantly negative. These results provide strong evidence that recent mergers lead to short-term
16decreases in competition, but over the longer term new entry and loan supply increases lead to a
restored competitive equilibrium, consistent with results in the literature.
Columns 2 through 4 of Panel C provide compelling evidence from the loan markets that bank
mergers cause a short-term disruption to the competitive landscape. We ﬁnd that increases in
∆BankHI1995:1997 signiﬁcantly increase interest rates, decrease loan frequency, and decrease loan
size, but the eﬀects of ∆BankHI1992:1994 are uniformly insigniﬁcant, and of the opposite sign in
the frequency and size regressions. Mergers in the last three years seem to worsen loan terms, but
mergers from the more distant three year period appear to have no residual eﬀect, consistent with
a short-term competitive distortion.
A.3 Robustness: Deals and mergers that should have no competitive eﬀects
One way to increase conﬁdence in the plausibility of our story is to examine a set of deals that
should be unaﬀected by local competition and a set of mergers that should have little competitive
impact and show that these do not aﬀect actual loan concentration or credit conditions.
Panel D of Table 2 provides results on the eﬀect of bank mergers on loan terms for the very
largest deals, property values of at least $10 million. Borrowers in the largest deals will typically
have access to a broader set of national banks and are thus less likely to be aﬀected by changes
in the competitiveness of the local banking market. Consistent with this, Panel D shows that an
increase in local bank market concentration has no eﬀe c to nl o a nr a t e s ,l o a nf r e q u e n c y ,o rl o a ns i z e
for the largest deals.
In Panel E of Table 2, we consider the eﬀects of a merger between two banks owned by the
same bank holding company (BHC). We hypothesize that such a merger is essentially an internal
corporate reorganization and that it should therefore not have a competitive eﬀect. Indeed, this is
our motivation for excluding such mergers from our main competition measure. Calculating a new
∆BankHI measure using only within-BHC mergers, we ﬁnd that such mergers have no eﬀect on
subsequent actual concentration, interest rates, loan frequency, or loan size, as predicted.
Finally, Panel F of Table 2 analyzes the eﬀects of mergers of failing banks. We exclude such
mergers from our main ∆BankHI measures because of greater endogeneity concerns with regard
to declining economic conditions and because the disappearance of a failing bank likely has only
as m a l le ﬀect on competition. While we do ﬁnd that mergers of failing banks lead to slightly
increased concentration, such mergers have negligible eﬀects on loan terms, consistent with failing
banks having little competitive eﬀects and mitigating endogeneity concerns.
17B. Real activity and the local economy
We next analyze the potential real eﬀects of the substantial decrease in the provision of bank debt
associated with large mergers in the local economy.
B.1 Investment and development
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 Panel A consider two proxies for the level of development in the
15 mile radius surrounding each property. In the ﬁrst column we consider the change in mean age
of properties and in the second the change in the fraction of properties less than 3 years old in
this region (we exclude the property itself). The change in average age of properties sold in a local
area indicates how much recent development has taken place in the area, since recently developed
properties will be young by deﬁnition. The fraction of properties less than three years old compares
the level of new development from 1995 to 1998 to the level of development from 1992 to 1995. We
regress these development variables on ∆BankHI1992:1995 and the set of control variables.
A st h et a b l ei n d i c a t e s ,t h ea v e r a g ea g eo fp r o p e r t i e sr i s e ss i g n i ﬁcantly and the fraction of
new/developed properties declines signiﬁcantly when local banking markets become less competi-
tive. A 90th percentile increase in the conditional variation of ∆BankHI1992:1995 raises the mean
age by 1.01 years and drops the fraction of new properties by 0.125 percent. Since the mean age of
properties is 35.55 years and 10 percent of properties are 3 years of age or younger, this increases
the mean age by 2.9 percent and decreases the fraction of new properties by 1.2 percent. These
results linking investment to well-functioning credit markets are consistent with the cross-country
work of King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) and the within-country work of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004).
B.2 Property prices
Neighborhoods with less new development will age and become less attractive with time as prop-
erties depreciate. This may in turn impact local real estate market prices and rents.
Column 3 of Panel A reports regression results of property prices on ∆BankHI1992:saleyear.T h e
dependent variable is the property capitalization rate (net operating income divided by price). The
measure ∆BankHI1992:saleyear is appropriate for this test since we are considering property prices
reported in the year of the sale. We include the controls from previous regressions.
The regression demonstrates that cap rates increase signiﬁcantly, or prices per unit of income
decrease signiﬁcantly, when the banking market becomes more concentrated. A 90th percentile
18increase in the conditional variation of ∆BankHI1992:saleyear generates about a 0.10 percentage
point increase in cap rates, which implies a 1 percent decrease in property prices (the mean cap
rate of 10.09 percent is given in Table 1). Given that the mean property value in our sample is
$2,387,000, this translates roughly into a $23,870 decline.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 Panel A show a general local deterioration from increased
bank concentration (due to mergers), as real estate investment declines and property values fall.
B.3 Income distribution, unemployment, and homeownership
We next consider the eﬀects on the income distribution of the neighborhood. To analyze this, we
make use of data from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. The results in Table 2 and Table 3 Panel
A illustrate the eﬀects of mergers on subsequent loan contracts, development, and prices, so any
changes in these latter variables are interpreted as being caused by mergers. For the census data this
is not possible, since given the time frame of our data we can only measure contemporaneous changes
in the merger and census variables. (One exception is the in-migration income test described below.)
This suggests a measure of caution in attributing causality to the following results, though we think
these ﬁndings are nonetheless interesting and supportive of our central hypothesis. We again defer
a detailed examination of the general question of causality to Section IV.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 3 Panel B we display results from regressing the percentage change
(from the 1990 to 2000 Censuses) of median household income on ∆BankHI1992:1999.W e ﬁnd a
highly signiﬁcant negative relationship: a 90th percentile increase in conditional bank concentration
reduces median income by about 3.9%. However, much of this income change is due to an exodus
of wealthier households from the tract and inﬂux of poorer households into the area. In the second
column of Panel B we show this migration of poorer households into the neighborhoods experiencing
increases in bank concentration. We regress the ratio of income of households who moved into the
tract in the last ﬁve years over the income of households who have resided in the tract for at least
ﬁve years on ∆BankHI1992:1995.W eﬁnd that neighborhoods with increased bank concentration in
1992 to 1995 experience an inﬂow (outﬂow) of relatively poorer (wealthier) residents in the period
1995 to 2000. Hence, the 3.9% reduction in income is a netting of these two migration eﬀects.
Consistent with this evidence, we also show in the third column of Panel B that unemployment
in a property’s census tract rises with an increase in bank concentration. In column 4 we further
show that income dispersion, deﬁned as the standard deviation of the fraction of households in
the eight census income categories, ranging from less than $15,000 to more than $150,000, in the
19property’s census tract, increases signiﬁcantly with bank concentration, despite the fact that median
income drops. This may be because the poor are disproportionately aﬀected by credit restrictions.
The ﬁnal column of Panel B considers the change in total vacancy and rental rates from 1990 to
2000 in the census tract in which the property resides. The positive coeﬃcient indicates that home
ownership rates decline as bank concentration increases.
C. Crime
There is substantial evidence in the economics of crime literature of a positive relationship between
unemployment and crime (e.g., Freeman (1999) and Freeman and Rodgers (1999)), though the
association is not overwhelmingly strong (e.g., Cullen and Levitt (1999)). Grogger (1998) and
Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) present clear evidence linking low legal wage opportunities to
increased crime. Kelly (2000) and Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002) document that crime
increases with economic inequality. The results in Table 3 that increases in bank concentration
lead to less development and lower prices, and are associated with an inﬂux of poorer households
and rising income inequality, suggest a potential causal connection between bank merger-induced
concentration and increased crime. Moreover, given potential social interaction multiplier eﬀects of
the type suggested by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996, 2002), the eﬀect on crime could
be signiﬁcant. It is also a general ﬁnding of the crime literature that unemployment, income, and
income dispersion are strongly related to property crime, while the association between economic
variables and personal (violent) crime is much weaker and perhaps nonexistent (Levitt (2001),
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), and Nilsson (2004)). Therefore, we examine how property
crimes and personal/violent crimes each change when banking markets become less competitive
through non-failing large bank mergers. We should not expect to ﬁnd much of an eﬀect on the
latter according to our proposed mechanism.
The dependent variable in the ﬁrst column of Table 4 Panel A is the percentage change in
burglary risk from 1995 to 2000 for the eight digit latitude and longitude location of the property.
The dependent variable in column two is the analogous change in general property crime. In all
regressions in this table we include a constant, county dummies, and property type dummies which
are omitted from the table for brevity as well as the other control variables. Since the change
in banking competitiveness is measured using only past transaction data, it should not exhibit
endogenous correlation with the dependent variable, future crime risk. Since crime risks are likely
to be serially correlated, however, we also include both the current level of crime (in 1995) and the
20most recent increase in crime (from 1990 to 1995) as controls in the regression.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 Panel A show that ∆BankHI1992:1995 signiﬁcantly increases
burglary and general property crime risk from 1995 to 2000. Hence, when large, non-failing bank
mergers cause the local banking market to consolidate and become less competitive, there is a
subsequent rise in burglaries and general property crimes over the next several years.
Columns 3 and 4 of Panel A employ homicide and personal crime risk as dependent variables. As
i n d i c a t e di nT a b l e4 ,∆BankHI1992:1995 has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on both homicide and personal
crime risks. These insigniﬁcant results are consistent with the evidence from the crime literature
described above that there is little connection between economic variables and personal crime. Note,
too, that the other local economic indicators used as controls also have little eﬀect on personal crime.
The fact that mergers increase property crime risks while having no eﬀect on personal crime risks
is consistent with the idea that the mechanism through which mergers increase crime is through a
negative eﬀect on the overall economic environment, highlighted in Tables 2 and 3.
For robustness, the ﬁfth and sixth columns of Panel A include the level of bank concentration
over the period 1992 to 1995 as an additional variable. The results are essentially unchanged by
the inclusion of this control.
To gauge the magnitude of the eﬀect of bank mergers on crime and how it compares to docu-
mented economic variable-crime relationships in the literature, we compute the elasticity of crime
to merger-induced bank concentration by regressing the percentage change in future crime on the










The results are reported in the two columns of Table 4 Panel B. The elasticities of burglary
and property crime with respect to bank concentration are 0.16 and 0.18, respectively. A 90th
percentile increase in %∆BankHI1992:1995 (conditional on the ﬁxed eﬀects) raises the burglary risk
by 0.56 percent and the property crime risk by 0.63 percent. The magnitudes of the crime eﬀects
that we document are in line with those in the literature. Grogger (1998), for instance, estimates
an elasticity of property crime to wages of 0.6 to 0.9. Rickman and Witt (2003) ﬁnd an elasticity of
t h e f tt ou n e m p l o y m e n to fa p p r o x i m a t e l y0 . 7 5 .G i v e nt h a tm e r g e r sa ﬀect crime indirectly, through
an economic mechanism, we would expect the crime-bank concentration elasticity to be lower than
that for direct economic variables such as unemployment and wages.
21C.1 Interactions with local market characteristics
It is interesting to investigate the types of neighborhoods most aﬀected by credit supply shocks
induced by mergers, particularly given the skewed distribution of these eﬀects evident in Figure 1.
I nT a b l e4P a n e lC ,w ec o n s i d e rd i ﬀerences across neighborhoods in the eﬀect of a merger-induced
increase in bank concentration on burglary and property crime. A priori, it seems reasonable
that the most disadvantaged neighborhoods are likely most aﬀected by a given increase in bank
concentration since the provision of ﬁnance in these neighborhoods may already be restricted. We
regress the change in burglary and property crime risks from 1995 to 2000 on ∆BankHI1992:1995
and ∆BankHI1992:1995 interacted with other local market variables. In the ﬁrst and sixth columns
of the table we show that an increase in ∆BankHI1992:1995 has the greatest eﬀect in increasing
crime in neighborhoods that previously already had higher bank concentrations. Columns 2 and
3 and 7 and 8 show that an increase in bank concentration has a signiﬁcantly greater eﬀect on
crime in neighborhoods with initially greater income dispersion and higher crime levels in 1990,
respectively. The regressions described in columns 4 and 9 show that the eﬀect of mergers on crime
is signiﬁcantly greater in areas with lower 1990 median incomes as well. In columns 5 and 10 we
report results from regressions that include all the interactions. Interactions of our merger variable
with previous bank concentration and median income remain signiﬁcant in these regressions.
These results indicate that more fragile neighborhoods already experiencing concentrated loan
markets and low median income are more aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nb a n kc o n c e n t r a t i o na r i s i n g
from mergers. Given the skewed distribution across neighborhoods of the eﬀect of mergers on loan
competition, it appears that our results are driven by a few extreme areas already in a fragile
state with high initial loan concentration, where a large bank merger may tilt the neighborhood
into further deterioration. Clearly, mergers per se are not uniformly bad, but in delicate and
marginal areas they seem to have signiﬁcant competitive eﬀects that generate economic and social
consequences. Furthermore, given potential social multiplier eﬀects suggested in the literature, it
may not take much to send a marginal neighborhood spiraling downward, though we can provide
no further evidence of such multiplier eﬀects.
C.2 The broader implications of bank merger-induced crime
To put our crime results into perspective, consider the total number of property crimes committed
each year in the United States. The FBI documents that the average number of property oﬀenses
was 11.1 million per year from 1995 to 2000 (our sample period for crime changes). Assuming
22that the mean change in banking concentration through mergers we observe in our data set from
1992 to 1995 (0.1 percent) applies nationally, this would translate into roughly an additional 24,300
property crime oﬀenses from 1995 to 2000, due solely to competitive eﬀects from large bank mergers.
Although a small fraction of total property crime, such increases clearly have signiﬁcant utility and
social consequences (see Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973)).
IV. Exogeneity of Competition Measure
We have argued that the use of non-failing, large bank mergers from the past provides an exogenous
measure of future competition changes in local areas. We now provide further evidence on the
exogeneity of the bank merger variable, particularly with regard to crime.
A. Does (whatever drives) future crime spur present-day mergers?
The regression results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 point to a link between bank mergers, loan terms, real
activity, and crime. Moreover, we have been careful to link bank merger activity to subsequent
increases in loan terms and crime. One interpretation of this link is a causal one, namely that
mergers reduce ﬁnancial access, which leads to neighborhood declines and subsequent increases in
crime. The leading alternative explanation for these correlations, however, is reverse causation,
namely that whatever unobservable variables aﬀect future crime drive present-day mergers. For
example, local economic conditions aﬀecting future crime risks may motivate bank mergers today.
One version of the reverse causation theory is that banks in declining neighborhoods may anticipate
further deterioration in their future lending positions. Concerned about their viability or falling
below minimum eﬃcient scale, the banks may seek mergers. Another version is that banks in
declining neighborhoods may understand that the equilibrium level of competition in such neigh-
borhoods is likely to decline in the future as the proﬁtability of the neighborhoods decline. Banks
may therefore merge today to reduce future competition in these neighborhoods.
A.1 Arguments against reverse causality
We believe that the reverse causal interpretation of our results is less plausible for several reasons.
First, commercial real estate loans typically comprise a small portion of a bank’s balance sheet.
For example, the FDIC’s History of the Eighties — Lessons for the Future (p. 159) documents
that among non-failing banks, commercial real estate loans were only 11 percent of assets in 1993.
Over the entire 1992 to 1999 period, the Federal Reserve estimates that total real estate loans
23(commercial and residential) comprised less than 13 percent of assets. Since we only consider
non-failing mergers, and since commercial real estate loans are a small fraction of bank assets, it is
unlikely that changes in commercial property values or commercial real estate lending is driving the
mergers we study. Moreover, in Table 3 we showed that even an increase in banking concentration
at the 90th percentile produced only a 1 percent decrease in property values. The eﬀect on the
value of the bank’s loan would be even smaller. For these reasons it is unlikely that banks are
merging in anticipation of future decreases in property values and increases in crime.
Second, we include county ﬁxed eﬀects in our analysis. It seems unlikely that bank mergers are
m o t i v a t e db yn e i g h b o r h o o d - l e v e lv a r i a t i o nw i t h i nc o u n t i e si nc u r r e n to ra n t i c i p a t e df u t u r ec r i m e
risks or economic declines. This is especially true of the particular mergers we use, whose size (at
least $1 billion in assets) and scope (operating in many neighborhoods) implies that the average
neighborhood eﬀect for these banks (controlling for county eﬀects) is likely to be quite small, by
the law of large numbers. Therefore, cross-neighborhood variation in real estate prices and crime
is very unlikely to motivate the mergers of these large banks.
Third, in the next section we will employ another measure of bank competition using state
branching deregulation as an instrument rather than mergers, and ﬁnd very similar eﬀects. It
seems unlikely that both instruments would be contaminated by the same endogeneity concerns,
lending strong support for these variables capturing exogenous competition changes.
A.2 Testing reverse causality directly
To provide clear evidence for or against the reverse causation theory we test several of its impli-
cations in Table 5. First, if trending crime risks cause mergers, future crime would have to be a
reﬂection of the current crime trend; in essence, current crime would be spurring contemporaneous
bank mergers. We note that the recent change in crime (from 1990 to 1995) is positively correlated
with future changes in crime (from 1995 to 2000). Hence, under this alternative hypothesis we
should see a signiﬁcant positive contemporaneous correlation between mergers and crime in the
period 1990 to 1995. As the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 Panel A indicate, however, we ﬁnd no
such relation in the data. The contemporaneous correlations between burglaries or property crime
and our merger variable are statistically no diﬀerent from zero.
We also examine in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 Panel A whether recent changes in crime or eco-
nomic activity, census-tract-level income growth and home value growth, predict future actual bank
concentration, capturing the eﬀects of both mergers and market consolidation occurring for other
24reasons. Neither burglary nor property crimes nor income growth predicts future bank concentra-
tion, but home value growth at the census tract level predicts reduced future bank concentration
with marginal statistical signiﬁcance. This suggests that declining neighborhoods are more likely
to experience future bank consolidation, which is consistent with a version of the reverse causation
hypothesis.
In our analysis, however, we are careful not to use the actual future change in bank concentra-
tion, but rather the concentration increase induced by previous mergers. It is precisely because of
our concern that future bank concentration may be endogenously related to crime that we use previ-
ous large mergers as an instrument. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 Panel B, we regress the measure
of future merger-induced concentration ∆BankHI1996:1999, as opposed to actual concentration, on
past crime, income growth, and home value growth. None of these variables predicts an increase
in merger-generated concentration. These results stress the importance of using an instrument for
bank competition via large, non-failing bank mergers and undermine the reverse causation theory;
there is no evidence that large bank mergers are taking place due to neighborhood declines.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 Panel B we address whether crime predicts merger activity directly
by regressing the probability of a merger of any bank active in a property’s neighborhood (linear
probability model) on the change in crime, income growth, and home value growth. Crime risks
predict signiﬁcantly fewer mergers, while the economic variables are insigniﬁcant. This suggests
that areas suﬀering from crime increases are less likely to experience a merger, which is contrary to
the reverse causation hypothesis. Thus, it is not the case that mergers are associated with future
crime increases because banks in declining areas merge.
B. Failing banks and non-lending institutions
Although our merger variable is constructed from only mergers between large, non-failing commer-
cial banks, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 Panel C we consider the eﬀects of mergers that involve
failing banks exclusively, requiring assistance from either the FDIC, RTC, NCUA, state or other
regulatory agency. If bank mergers increase subsequent crime rates due to a competitive eﬀect,
then these assisted mergers should have little impact on future crime. Failing banks are likely not
providing much competition for other banks before the merger so their removal from the market
should not typically have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. On the other hand, if the association between bank
mergers and future crime arises from mergers of weak banks in declining neighborhoods (reverse
causality), then the eﬀect should be strongest for these assisted mergers, since failing banks are
25more likely to be active in declining neighborhoods. Our data contain an additional 18 failing
banks who merged in our sample. We recompute the bank merger concentration measure using
these banks only and regress future crime risk changes on it. We ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for
burglary, and a marginally signiﬁcant but negative coeﬃcient for property crimes, contradicting the
reverse causal story and providing further support for a causal link from non-failing bank mergers
to future crime.
For further robustness, columns 3 and 4 report results from regressing the 1995 to 2000 changes
in crime risks on changes in the number of non-lending ﬁnancial institutions from 1990 to 1995,
obtained from the County Business Patterns of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.13 Under a
reverse causation theory, economic decline should cause both a decrease in the current number
of non-lending ﬁnancial institutions and a future increase in crime, leading to a spurious negative
correlation between the two, in analogy to the reverse causal argument for bank mergers and crime.
If, on the other hand, our conjecture that the merger of banks causes an increase in crime through
poorer credit conditions, then a decrease in non-lending ﬁnancial institutions should not have any
eﬀect on future crime, since these institutions themselves do not aﬀect loan supply. As the last
two columns of Table 5 indicate, there is no evidence of an association between the number of non-
lending ﬁnancial institutions and future crime risks. This does not support the reverse causation
theory, but is consistent with our story of credit access, development, and social spillovers.
C. Separating the merger eﬀect from the competition eﬀect
As an additional test of the exogeneity of our instrument, we separate the eﬀect of the merger
per se from the eﬀect of reduced competition caused by mergers. Speciﬁcally, we augment our
∆BankHI measure with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a merger took place in the local banking
market and zero otherwise. The dummy variable contrasts local markets where a merger took place
with those where one did not, making no distinction between the potential impact of the merger on
competition using prior bank concentration information. We propose the merger-presence variable
as a means of capturing the non-competition aspects of a merger, such as those arising from reverse
causation or other unobservables.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the eﬀect of the merger itself (the dummy variable) on loan rates,
loan size, and crime risks. The merger itself does not have the eﬀe c to nl o a nt e r m sa n dc r i m e
13Non-lending ﬁnancial institutions are deﬁned as the number of establishments with NAICS codes of 523 (securities,
commodity contracts, and other ﬁnancial investments), 524 (insurance carriers and related activities), and 525 (funds,
trusts, and other ﬁnancial vehicles), obtained at the county level.
26risks predicted by the reverse causation hypothesis. Controlling for the eﬀect on the competitive
environment, mergers per se have no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on loan rate, burglary risk, and
property crime risk and have a positive eﬀect on loan size, which is of the opposite predicted
sign. The coeﬃcients on ∆BankHI show that it is the extent of the merger-induced diminution in
competition, not the fact of the merger, that predicts economic and social activity.
Panel B reports results for mergers with no predicted competitive eﬀects exclusively, where we
examine the merger dummy variable conditional on ∆BankHI = 0. This considers all mergers
in which outsider banks purchase an insider bank operating in a neighborhood, where the ex
ante expected change in local bank concentration is zero. Hence, there should be little eﬀect on
local competition associated with these mergers according to our story. On the other hand, if
mergers are motivated by declining neighborhoods (reverse causation), then these outsider-insider
mergers will be associated with the outcome variables. As Panel B details, mergers in which
outsider banks acquire insider banks, which should have no local competitive eﬀects, indeed do not
signiﬁcantly predict changes in loan rates, burglary risk, or property crime risk, and are associated
with larger, rather than smaller, bank loans. These ﬁndings are inconsistent with the reverse
causation hypothesis and support the exogeneity of competition being captured by our measure.
We have shown that crime increases are not correlated with contemporaneous or future bank
mergers. Neighborhood-level economic variables are not associated with the likelihood of a merger.
Failing-bank mergers, which should be most aﬀected by declining neighborhoods, are not correlated
with future increases in crime risk. Decreases in the number of non-lending ﬁnancial institutions
do not predict increased crime. It is the decrease in competition, not the fact of the merger, that
predicts future crime increases, and mergers between outsider and insider banks, with no local
competitive eﬀects, are not correlated with future rises in crime. In the face of this collection of
evidence, the contention that banks are merging in anticipation of future neighborhood-level decline
s t r i k e su sa sn o tv e r yp l a u s i b l e .
V. County and State Level Regressions
For robustness, we supplement our neighborhood-level evidence with county and state level evidence
from bank competition. This provides an additional test of our hypothesis, additional variables not
available at the neighborhood level, and out of sample evidence on crime from another data source
and over another time period. In addition, state level data allow for the use of another exogenous
measure of competition using state branching regulation.
27A. County level construction and crime
While migration is likely to be less important at the county level than at the neighborhood level,
a merger-induced constriction of credit should still have implications for construction and crime at
the county level. One advantage of using county-level data is that explicit construction estimates
a r ea v a i l a b l e . W ea r ea l s oa b l et ou s et h eF B IU C Ra tt h ec o u n t yl e v e lt oc o m p a r et ot h eC a p
Index crime scores. This provides further robustness.
In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 7 Panel A we regress the county-level changes in number
of construction companies and employees from 1995 to 2000 on ∆BankHI1992:1995,t h el e v e la n d
change in property crime risk, and the usual controls. The construction data come from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis County Business Patterns.F o r
these county-level regressions we include state ﬁxed eﬀects and compute standard errors assuming
group-wise clustering at the county level. The results show that increased merger activity in 1992 to
1995 strongly predicts a reduction in both the number of construction companies and construction
employees in the subsequent period.
Columns three and four examine the impact of bank mergers on development by employing
construction data from F.W. Dodge Division of the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. The change
from 1995 to 2000 in the total value of construction (in $1,000) and in the number of units being
c o n s t r u c t e da r er e g r e s s e do n∆BankHI1992:1995 and the standard controls. As the table indicates,
the value and number of units both decline when local banking markets become more concentrated.
Panel B reports results from regressions of county-level crime rates (reported crimes per capita)
from the FBI’s UCR on our measure of merger-generated increases in bank concentration. In column
1 we show that the number of reported burglaries per capita increases with our bank concentration
variable. This is consistent with our previous evidence from neighborhood-level regressions using
CAP Index data. In column 2 we report that the number of reported homicides per capita is not
signiﬁcantly predicted by the bank concentration variable, which is also consistent with our previous
results. These results support the hypothesis that bank mergers increase future crime through their
negative eﬀect on the economic environment, which the crime literature shows is closely linked to
property crimes such as burglary but not violent crimes or homicides.
In columns 3 and 4 of Panel B, we introduce control variables for the lagged average state
abortion rate (the average number of abortions per 1,000 live births) from 1982 to 1986 and the log
of the imprisonment rate (number of prisoners per capita) from 1994 to 1995 in place of state ﬁxed
28eﬀects.14 The results show that merger-induced bank concentration increases burglaries and has
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on homicide, even after controlling for the lagged abortion and imprisonment
rates, both of which have been shown to capture substantial variation in crime (Levitt (1996),
Donohue and Levitt (2001)).
B. State branching deregulation: An out of sample test
As a ﬁnal test, we employ another exogenous measure for changing bank competition using state
variation in bank branching regulation. Black and Strahan (2002) use changes in intra- and inter-
state banking and branching regulation to instrument for banking competitiveness and examine the
impact on small business lending as proxied by the number of incorporations in a state. Branching
liberalization is linked to branch openings, new entrants, and increased number of incorporations
and borrowing activity. Most of this regulation takes place in the 1970s and 1980s, however unre-
stricted branching was adopted in some states during the 1990’s, providing some variation on state
bank regulation over our sample period from 1992 to 1999.15 Speciﬁcally, we employ the number
of years since the state ﬁrst allowed unrestricted bank branching, which usually meant that a bank
c o u l do p e nan e wb r a n c ha n y w h e r ei nt h es t a t e .T h i sv a r i a b l et a k e so nt h ev a l u ez e r oi ft h es t a t e
had yet to institute unrestricted branching at the time of the property sale. Unrestricted branching
should increase competition in local bank markets, hence we expect this variable to have eﬀects
opposite those of mergers.
The ﬁrst column of Panel A of Table 8 reports results from regressions of local bank concentra-
tion on unrestricted branching in a state. The usual controls for each regression apply, but standard
errors are calculated assuming group-wise clustering at the state and year level. As the table in-
dicates, unrestricted branching decreases subsequent bank concentration levels in neighborhoods.
Hence, deregulation seems to increase competition. The next three columns examine the impact of
deregulation on loan rates, loan sizes, and prices. Consistent with our earlier ﬁndings, loan rates
decrease with competition and loan sizes and prices increase with competition. The magnitude of
the eﬀects is smaller though similar to those obtained via the merger variable for competition.
In Panel B, we examine crime rates at the state level in conjunction with branching deregulation.
14The abortion data come from the Alan Guttmacher Institute surveys from the Bureau of the Census United States
Statistical Abstract and the prisoner population data come from Correctional Populations in the United States from
the Bureau of Justice Statistics. These measures are employed by Donohue and Levitt (2001) and were graciously
supplied by the authors.
15California, Washington DC, Maryland, Nevada, and New York all adopted unrestricted branching in the early
to mid 1970’s, Massachusetts, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia adopted in the late 1980’s, Illinois in 1993, and Colorado
and Georgia had not adopted by 1997.
29Since we are using state branching deregulation and crime rate data at the state level from the
FBI’s UCR, we are no longer restricted to the COMPS database. Thus, we employ crime rate data
from all 50 states plus the District of Columbia over the extended period 1978 to 2001.16 This also
allows us to employ a richer (both cross-sectionally and time-series) state bank branching measure
since states adopted unrestricted branching throughout the 1970’s, 80’s, and 90’s. Moreover, this
provides an out of sample test of our hypothesis using new data from new regions and time periods.
The dependent variable in Panel B is the year-to-year change in crime (reported homicides and
burglaries per capita) from year t−1t oy e a rt, regressed on a post unrestricted branching indicator
which takes on the value one if the state adopted unrestricted branching within the last ﬁve years.
Other control regressors include the lagged annual change from year t − 2t oy e a rt − 1 in state
population, employment per capita, social services employees per capita, income, and imprisonment
rate. We also employ the lagged annual change in the state abortion rate from 16 years ago (i.e.,
from t − 17 to t − 16) as an additional regressor. Due to data limitations, regressions that include
the lagged abortion rate begin in 1987. Because we are interested in cross-sectional diﬀerences in
changes in crime rates across states, we examine ﬁrst diﬀerences in our regressions. Furthermore,
because we focus on cross-sectional diﬀerences in diﬀerences, we run the regressions in the style of
Fama and MacBeth (1973), where each year a cross-sectional regression (across the 51 states) is run
and the time-series average of the yearly cross-sectional coeﬃcient estimates and their associated
time-series standard errors are calculated. This procedure ignores time-series variation, focusing
exclusively on the cross-section. More importantly, standard errors are robust to cross-correlation
in the residual (due to year or other eﬀects).17
As Panel B of Table 8 indicates, the post state branching variable has a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on burglary, with point estimates of small, though similar, magnitude to those obtained from
our merger variable in the COMPS sample. The eﬀect on homicide is negative, but statistically
insigniﬁcant, as in our previous results. These ﬁndings, on a new data set, over a diﬀerent sample
period, across all states, and using a new exogenous measure of competition, bolster our contention
that there is a link between credit market competitiveness, real activity, and crime.
16Although crime rate data go back to 1960, many of the control variables we employ, such as state income and
social services employees, date back only to 1977. Since we regress changes in crime on lagged changes in these
variables, the sample starts in 1978.
17The Fama-MacBeth procedure produces conservative standard errors by allowing anything that drives variation
in the year-to-year coeﬃcient estimates to show up in the standard error. This eﬀectively ignores any cross-sectional
residual correlation from the yearly regressions, resulting in robust standard errors. For further detail regarding this
method and its merits see Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Cochrane (2001).
30VI. Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that the neighborhoods most aﬀected by bank mergers subse-
quently experience signiﬁcantly worse credit terms, less development and investment, lower real
estate prices, an inﬂow of poorer households, and greater increases in property crime in subsequent
years. These results are conﬁrmed by our ﬁnding that state branching deregulation leads to more
credit supply and less future property crime. Our results highlight that credit market imperfections
can have important spillover eﬀects on both economic and social outcomes.
These ﬁndings suggest that in evaluating the impact of bank mergers, regulators would do well
to consider not only the present bank concentration of potentially aﬀected markets, but also the
social fragility of these markets. Neighborhoods that already suﬀer from low median incomes and
poor loan competition experience greater increases in crime after a merger-induced reduction in
banking competition. We do not argue that every bank merger has a negative impact on local
credit conditions, but our results do suggest that it would be reasonable to apply greater scrutiny
to mergers aﬀecting low-income areas. Clearly, mergers per se are not uniformly bad, but in delicate
and marginal areas they seem to have signiﬁcant competitive eﬀects that generate economic and
social consequences.
We propose and provide evidence on one simple mechanism connecting crime and real activity
to the market for ﬁnance, but a more general link between ﬁnancial access, development, and social
outcomes may be worth pursuing. If, as has been shown here and by others, ineﬃcient loan markets
retard development, then a range of economic and social issues including, for example, education
and health care might be connected to the availability of ﬁnance. Future research may carefully
consider the broader role of competitive and well-functioning credit markets in fostering economic
development and social harmony.
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34Appendix A: Examples of Mergers Included and Excluded from the Competition
Measure
Table A1 presents examples of the bank and bank holding company mergers included and excluded from our measure
of the predicted change in bank loan concentration through mergers. Only mergers between non-failing banks or bank
holding companies with at least $1 billion in assets are included in our competition measure. Two examples of bank
mergers included in our measure are provided along with two examples each of bank mergers excluded from our measure
due to failure (requiring assistance from either the FDIC, RTC, NCUA, state or other regulatory agency), mergers within
the same holding company, or assets less than $1 billion.
Table A1:
Examples of Mergers Included and Excluded from the Competition Measure
Type of New Included?
Acquirer Target Union Date Name Excluded? Reason
(1) National Bank The First National Holding Company Dec., 1995 First Chicago Included Met all criteria
of Detroit Bank of Chicago Acquisition NBD Corp.
(2) Wells First Inter- Merger Apr.-Jun., 1996 Wells Included Met all criteria
Fargo Bank state Bankcorp Fargo Bank
(3) California Paciﬁc Merger July, 1995 California Excluded Required
Federal Bank Heritage Bank Federal Bank assistance (failure)
(4) Union Bank of Merger August, 1994 Union Excluded Required
Bank Newport Bank assistance (failure)
(5) The Bank of Coast Merger Dec., 1992 The Bank of Excluded Same Holding
San Diego Bank San Diego Company
(6) Corus Lincoln Merger June, 1996 Corus Excluded Same Holding
Bank National Bank Bank Company
(7) Mountain Parks The Kiowa Merger Aug., 1996 Mountain Parks Excluded Acquired bank had
Bank - East State Bank Bank - East $41 million in assets
(8) US Trust Somerset Merger July, 1998 US Trust Excluded Acquired bank had
Savings Bank $533 million in assetsTable 1:
Summary Statistics of Bank Mergers, Commercial
Real Estate Transactions, and Crime Risk in the U.S. from 1992 to 1999
Panel A reports the distributional characteristics of the property transactions in the COMPS database over the period January 1,
1992 to March 30, 1999. The mean, median, standard deviation, and one and 99 percentiles of sale price, capitalization rate (net
operating income divided by sales price), property age, loan size (loan-to-value), loan interest rate, and loan maturity are reported.
Panel B reports statistics on the banks making loans in the COMPS database and on bank merger and acquisition activity of those
banks (obtained from the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company Merger Database and Call Report
Database). Statistics are reported separately for large banks that have at least $1 billion in assets. Mergers are documented
separately for those between two large banks, those involving a failing bank (where one of the banks required assistance from the
FDIC, RTC, NCUA, state, or other regulatory agencies), and for banks within the same bank holding company (BHC). These
three classes of mergers are mutually exclusive. The mean and standard deviation of the actual Herﬁndahl concentration index of
commercial real estate bank loans (from all banks) within 15 miles of the property (excluding the property itself) from year yr1
to year yr2 are also reported. Panel C reports local crime risk scores at three points in time (1990, 1995, and 2000) for crimes
against person (homicide) and property (burglary) for the location in which the property resides. Crime scores relative to their
national and county averages are obtained from CAP Index, Inc. Correlations between the Cap Index crime risks and the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) crime rates (reported number of crimes per capita) are also reported.
Panel A: Summary statistics of sale and loan transactions
Standard
Mean Median deviation 1
st%9 9
th%
Sale price ($US) 2,387,000 600,000 10,481,000 110,000 27,000,000
Capitalization rate (percent) 10.09 9.82 2.79 4.64 17.27
Property age (years) 35.55 30.00 30.53 1 106
Loan size (% of price) 75.83 77.77 15.99 20.00 100.00
Interest rate (percent) 8.28 8.25 1.40 5 11.75
Maturity (years) 15.95 15.00 10.74 0.50 30.00
Panel B: Bank merger and acquisition activity
All banks Large banks (> $1 billion in assets)
# Banks 769 210
# Loans made 8,364 5,092
Value of loans made ($bill.) $9.8211 $7.3092
Minimum loan value $1,318 $1,318
Average loan value $1,174,630 $1,435,720
Maximum loan value $220 million $220 million
Average value of property $1,616,450 $1,986,632
# States made loans to 12 12
# Counties made loans to 42 38
# Zip codes made loans to 1,028 881
All Large Failing Same BHC
# Bank mergers and acquisitions 316 80 18 75
Actual level of bank concentration: BankHI
actual level
1992 : 1995 1992 : saleyear 1992 : 1999
Mean 0.0526 0.0576 0.0589
Standard deviation 0.0273 0.0291 0.0310
Panel C: Summary statistics of crime risk from Cap Index, Inc.
Relative to National Average Relative to County Average
Standard Correlation Standard Correlation
Mean deviation with UCR Mean deviation with UCR
Homicide risk1990 1.95 1.85 0.33 1.49 1.06 -0.11
Homicide risk1995 2.01 1.97 0.38 1.51 1.10 -0.12
Homicide risk2000 2.02 1.95 0.37 1.52 1.09 -0.11
Burglary risk1990 3.32 3.55 0.58 1.80 1.25 -0.05
Burglary risk1995 3.04 3.04 0.56 1.81 1.15 -0.05
Burglary risk2000 2.94 2.90 0.56 1.80 1.10 -0.05
36Table 2:
The Impact of Bank Mergers on Competition, Loan Rates, and Borrowing Activity
T h ea c t u a lc h a n g ei nb a n kl o a nc o n c e n t r a t i o n ,l o a nr a t e ,l o a nf r e q u e n c y ,a n dl o a ns i z ea r er e g r e s s e do np r e d i c t i v em e a s u r e so f
changing local bank competition through various sets of mergers, ∆BankHIyr1:yr2, which is the sum of the individual year
diﬀerences between the actual Herﬁndahl concentration index of commercial loans within 15 miles of a property and the hypo-
thetical concentration index assuming all bank mergers took place at the beginning of each year. Salyear is the year in which
the property sold. All regressions include the current property crime risk (1995), recent change in property crime (from 1990 to
1995), local price variation, which is the cross-sectional variation of capitalization rates on properties within 15 miles, and recent
growth in population, per capita income, and median home value for the census tract (from the 1990 to 2000 Census). Loan
interest rate regressions also include the loan-to-value ratio, an indicator for ﬂoating rates and SBA-backed loans, and length
of amortization and maturity. A constant and ﬁxed eﬀects for property type, year, and county are included in all regressions.
Loan term regressions also include bank ﬁxed eﬀects. Coeﬃcient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are
reported with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level. Panel A employs mergers between
all non-failing banks and bank holding companies with at least $1 billion in assets. For the same set of mergers, Panel B employs
a value-weighted concentration measure, Panel C examines only those deals in 1998 and 1999, and Panel D examines property
deals worth at least $10 million. Panel E employs mergers between banks within the same bank holding company (BHC) and
Panel F employs mergers between banks where at least one bank is failing, requiring assistance from the FDIC, RTC, NCUA,
state, or other regulatory agency.
P a n e lA :M e r g e r sb e t w e e nl a r g e( a s s e t s> $1 billion) banks and bank holding companies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Actual Loan Loan Loan
variable = ∆BankHI rate frequency size
∆BankHI1992:1995 0.7802
(5.21)
∆BankHI1992:saleyear 32.9045 -2.0473 -2.2018
(3.30) (-1.60) (-2.81)
Crime1995 -0.0012 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001
(-1.30) (2.37) (3.47) (5.28)
%∆Crime1990:1995 0.0036 -0.0812 -0.0036 -0.0111
(0.65) (-0.45) (-0.15) (-0.61)
Price variation -0.0015 0.2224 0.0303 0.0032
(-1.52) (1.96) (1.97) (0.41)
Population growth -0.0001 0.0145 -0.0001 0.0001
(-0.90) (1.15) (-0.07) (0.26)
Income growth 0.0003 -0.0108 -0.0002 0.0001
(12.88) (-2.05) (-0.61) (0.23)
Home value growth -0.0007 0.0158 -0.0021 0.0002












Year No Yes Yes Yes
Property type Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank No Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R
2 0.94 0.30 0.01 0.03
N 22,317 6,267 16,131 16,131
N cluster 1,147 915 1,162 1,162
37P a n e lB :V a l u e( $ )w e i g h t e dc o n c e n t r a t i o nm e a s u r e s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Actual Loan Loan Loan
variable = ∆BankHI rate frequency size
∆BankHI1992:1995 0.6206
(3.03)
∆BankHI1992:saleyear 31.8839 -1.9255 -2.0652
(3.63) (-1.69) (-2.95)
Adj. R
2 0.91 0.30 0.01 0.03
N 22,317 6,267 16,131 16,131
Panel C: Only deals from 1998 and 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Actual Loan Loan Loan
variable = ∆BankHI rate frequency size
∆BankHI1992:1994 -5.7718 27.4350 6.8218 1.0305
(-2.54) (0.54) (1.21) (0.33)
∆BankHI1995:1997 2.8548 30.1367 -2.7793 -2.3124
(2.45) (2.75) (-1.82) (-2.48)
Adj. R
2 0.79 0.30 0.01 0.03
N 3,299 899 3,282 3,282
P a n e lD :D e a l s> $10 million, not likely aﬀected by local competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Loan Loan Loan
variable = rate frequency size
∆BankHI1992:saleyear -9.1930 -2.1470 -1.4040
(-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.51)
Adj. R
2 0.15 0.01 0.01
N 94 471 471
P a n e lE :M e r g e r sw i t h i nt h es a m eB H C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Actual Loan Loan Loan
variable = ∆BankHI rate frequency size
∆BankHI1992:1995 -0.1990
(-0.28)
∆BankHI1992:saleyear 5.7310 -0.6327 -0.1624
(0.95) (-0.28) (-0.11)
Adj. R
2 0.79 0.29 0.01 0.03
N 22,633 6,267 16,131 16,131
P a n e lF :M e r g e r so ff a i l i n gb a n k s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Actual Loan Loan Loan
variable = ∆BankHI rate frequency size
∆BankHI1992:1995 6.8415
(1.82)
∆BankHI1992:saleyear 13.3604 185.0766 30.1756
(1.33) (1.25) (0.37)
Adj. R
2 0.81 0.30 0.01 0.03
N 22,615 6,267 16,131 16,131
38Table 3:
The Impact of Bank Competition (through Mergers) on the Local Economy
Panel A reports regression results of real investment proxies and property cap rates on predicted changes in local
bank competition measured through mergers. Panel B reports regression results of percentage changes from 1990
to 2000 in census tract level median income, income migration (the ratio of income of households who moved into
the tract within the last ﬁve years over the income of households who have resided in the tract at least ﬁve years),
unemployment, income dispersion (deﬁned as the standard deviation of the fraction of households in the eight
census income categories), and rental and vacancy rates on predicted changes in local bank competition measured
through mergers. Predicted changes in local bank competition are measured as described in Figure 1 and Table
2. All regressions include a constant, current property crime risk (1995), recent growth in property crime (from
1990 to 1995), local price variation, recent growth in population, income, and home value for the census tract, and
property type and county ﬁxed eﬀects, which are omitted from the table for brevity. The cap rate regression also
includes year ﬁxed eﬀects. Coeﬃcient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with
robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level for cap rate and age regressions
and at the census tract level for the census statistics regressions.
Panel A: Investment, development, and prices
(1) (2) (3)
∆Mean ∆%Age< Cap rate






Year No No Yes
Property type Yes Yes Yes
County Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R
2 0.84 0.76 0.24
N 15,734 15,734 10,070
N cluster 873 873 978
Panel B: Income distribution, unemployment, and vacancy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
%∆Median Income ∆Income ∆Vacancy
Dependent variable = income migration ∆Unemployment dispersion and rental
∆BankHI1992:1995 -7.3931
(-4.16)
∆BankHI1992:1999 -5.5486 10.3268 561.9380 41.7708
(-2.54) (3.59) (2.87) (10.35)
Fixed eﬀects:
Property type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R
2 0.22 0.11 0.25 0.02 0.43
N 16,910 9,343 16,154 17,763 16,900
N cluster 2,308 1,083 2,252 2,341 2,306
39Table 4:
The Impact of Bank Competition (through Mergers) on Crime
The percentage change in future crime risk from 1995 to 2000 for the eight digit latitude and longitude location in which
each property resides is regressed on the predicted change in local bank competition induced by mergers from 1992 to 1995,
∆BankHI1992:1995,a sd e ﬁned in Figure 1 and Table 2. Crime risk variables come from Cap Index, Inc. and pertain to
burglary, a property crime index which includes burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, homicide, and a crime index for
personal crimes which include homicide, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery. Panel A reports reduced form regression
results of crime risk changes directly on the merger-predicted concentration variable. Panel B reports elasticity estimates
by regressing the percentage change in future crime risk on the percentage change in BankHI induced by mergers. Panel
C reports results from regressions that include interaction terms between ∆BankHI1992:1995 and characteristics of the local
market in which the property resides: the actual level of bank concentration from 1992 to 1995, dispersion in income within
the census tract from the 1990 Census, level of crime in 1995, and median income in the census tract in 1990. All regressions
include current crime risk (1995), recent growth in crime (from 1990 to 1995), local price variation, and recent growth in
population, income, and home value for the census tract. A constant and property type and county ﬁxed eﬀects are also
included. Coeﬃcient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with robust standard errors that
assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level.
Panel A: Dependent variable = future change in crime risk %∆Crime1995:2000
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 ) ( 6 )
Burglary Property Homicide Personal Burglary Property
∆BankHI1992:1995 0.3741 0.4377 0.3131 -0.0196 0.3720 0.4404





Crime1995 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-31.88) (-8.24) (-2.91) (5.03) (-31.45) (-8.28)
%∆Crime1990:1995 0.2309 0.2586 0.0653 0.1864 0.2309 0.2586
(24.18) (18.90) (7.45) (13.74) (24.14) (18.90)
Price variation -0.0011 -0.0044 0.0036 0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0044
(-2.44) (-2.37) (1.00) (1.52) (-2.49) (-2.37)
Population growth -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001
(-1.24) (0.73) (1.37) (1.49) (-1.24) (0.73)
Income growth 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(4.15) (1.50) (1.44) (1.27) (4.15) (1.50)
Home value growth -0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0015 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0021
(-5.17) (-4.79) (-2.73) (0.89) (-5.17) (-4.79)
Fixed eﬀects:
Property type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R
2 0.87 0.86 0.75 0.89 0.87 0.86
N 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317
N cluster 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146











N cluster 1,146 1,146
40Panel C: Interactions with local market characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Burglary Property
∆BankHI1992:1995 1.3403 -0.3715 -1.1934 1.0090 0.9838 2.1244 0.0040 0.0185 2.1587 4.0530
(2.98) (-0.60) (-3.05) (3.07) (1.62) (3.23) (0.01) (0.07) (3.99) (3.87)
×BankHI
actual level
1992−1995 0.0010 0.0031 0.0010 0.0054
(1.82) (1.83) (1.96) (2.26)
×Income dispersion 21.0024 9.7015 15.5402 -4.0742
in 1990 (2.16) (0.57) (2.52) (-0.38)
×Crime level 0.0095 0.0005 0.0030 0.0011
in 1995 (4.54) (0.28) (2.01) (1.00)
×Median income -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
in 1990 (-2.36) (-1.92) (-3.52) (-3.47)
Fixed eﬀects:
Property type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R
2 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
N 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317
N cluster 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146
41Table 5:
Does (Whatever Drives) Future Crime Spur Current Mergers?
The ﬁrst two columns of Panel A report results from regressions of the percentage change in the current crime risk from 1990 to
1995 on the contemporaneous bank merger variable for local bank concentration. Columns 3 and 4 report regression results of the
actual future change in banking concentration from 1996 to 1999 on recent trends in crime risk, median income, and home value for
the census tract. The ﬁrst two (last two) columns of Panel B report regression results of the change in banking concentration due to
mergers from 1996 to 1999 (probability of a merger) on recent trends in crime risk, median income, and home value. The ﬁrst two
(last two) columns of Panel C report results from regressions of future changes in crime from 1995 to 2000 on the predicted change
in bank concentration due to mergers involving a failing bank (changes in the number of non-lending ﬁnancial institutions from 1990
to 1995). Non-lending ﬁnancial institutions are obtained from the County Business Patterns of the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and are deﬁned as the number of establishments with NAICS codes of 523, 524, and 525. All regressions include a constant, and
the control variables from Table 4. Coeﬃcient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with robust
standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level for all regressions except those for non-lending ﬁnancial
institutions, which assume group-wise clustering at the county level.
Panel A: Are crime and merger-induced bank Does crime or economic activity
consolidation contemporaneously related? predict future bank consolidation?
Dependent variable = %∆ Crime1990:1995 ∆BankHI
actual
1996:1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Burglary Property Burglary Property
∆BankHI1992:1995 0.0398 -0.0432
(0.20) (-0.37)
%∆ Crime1990:1995 -0.0061 -0.0346
(-0.35) (-1.54)
Income growth 0.0005 0.0003
(0.47) (0.24)
Home value growth -0.0006 -0.0006
(-1.65) (-1.92)
County ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317
N cluster 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146
Panel B: Does crime or economic activity predict Does crime or economic activity
bank consolidation due to mergers? predict merger activity?
Dependent variable = ∆BankHI1996:1999 Probability of a merger
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Burglary Property Burglary Property
%∆ Crime1990:1995 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0935 -0.0897
(-1.54) (-0.76) (-2.59) (-2.08)
Income growth 0.0001 0.0001 0.0058 0.0064
(0.98) (1.09) (0.65) (0.72)
Home value growth 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0025
(1.20) (1.24) (-0.74) (-0.70)
County ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317
N cluster 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146
Panel C: Do mergers of failing banks Do changes in #non-lending ﬁnancial
predict future crime risk? institutions predict crime risk?
Dependent variable = %∆ Crime1995:2000 %∆ Crime1995:2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)





∆ Non-lending1990:1995 -0.0006 -0.0186
(-0.24) (-1.51)
County ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes No No
N 22,317 22,317 22,317 22,317
N cluster 1,146 1,146 53 53
42Table 6:
Separating the Merger Eﬀect from the Competition Eﬀect
Panel A reports results from regressions of the actual change in bank loan concentration, loan rate, loan
size, and future change in crime risk on the predicted change in local banking competitiveness measured
through mergers between non-failing banks and bank holding companies with at least $1 billion in assets,
∆BankHIyr1:yr2, and a dummy variable for the presence of a merger. The former variable captures the
predicted competitive eﬀects of mergers and the latter captures the eﬀect of the merger per se, irrespective
of its competitive eﬀects. Panel B repeats the regressions on the merger dummy variable alone for only
those properties residing in an area where mergers have no predicted eﬀect on competition (i.e., where the
continuous measure ∆BankHIyr1:yr2 = 0). All regressions include a constant and all of the control variables
from Tables 2 and 4, including property type and county ﬁxed eﬀects as well as year and bank ﬁxed eﬀects for
the loan term regressions. Coeﬃcient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported
with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level.
P a n e lA :A l lp r o p e r t yt r a n s a c t i o n s
Changes in future crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan Loan %∆Crime1995:2000





Merger dummy -0.0588 0.0168 -0.0003 0.0013
(-1.12) (2.82) (-0.27) (1.38)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year Yes Yes No No
Property type Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Yes Yes No No
Adj. R
2 0.28 0.03 0.87 0.86
N 6,267 11,809 22,317 22,317
N cluster 915 1,100 1,146 1,146
Panel B: Mergers with no predicted competitive eﬀects, ∆BankHI =0
Changes in future crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan Loan %∆Crime1995:2000
Dependent variable = rate size Burglary Property
Merger dummy 0.0552 0.0278 0.0001 0.0001
(0.47) (8.72) (0.09) (0.10)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year Yes Yes No No
Property type Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Yes Yes No No
Adj. R
2 0.34 0.03 0.84 0.78
N 3,593 5,958 14,544 14,544
N cluster 580 688 801 801
43Table 7:
County Level Eﬀects and FBI Uniform Crime Reports
County level regressions of changes in future real activity and crime on predicted changes in local bank competition
through bank mergers of non-failing commercial bank and bank holding companies with at least $1 billion in assets are
reported. Panel A reports results for construction and business activity and Panel B for crime rates from the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Reports. The dependent variables in the ﬁrst two columns of Panel A are the county level changes
from 1995 to 2000 in number of construction employees and companies, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and Bureau of Economic Analysis County Business Patterns. The last two columns of Panel A employ county level
changes from 1995 to 2000 in total value of new construction ($1,000) and number of new units constructed as dependent
variables, obtained from F.W. Dodge Division of the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. The dependent variables in Panel
B are county level changes from 1995 to 2000 in reported homicides and burglaries per capita. All regressions include a
constant, the current crime rate (1995), recent growth in crime (from 1990 to 1995), local price variation, recent growth
in population, income, and home value (from the 1990 to 2000 Census), and state ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, for the
crime rate regressions results are reported employing the average abortion rate from 1982 to 1986 for the state in which
the property resides and the log of the average state imprisonment rate (number of prisoners per capita) from 1994 to
1995. Coeﬃcient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported with robust standard errors
that assume group-wise clustering at the county level.
Panel A: County level new construction activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable = ∆Number of Construction ∆New Construction
Employees Companies Value Units
∆BankHI1992:1995 -18.6751 -0.7493 -6.3611 -6.4089
(-5.09) (-4.54) (-7.29) (-11.97)
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R
2 0.41 0.69 0.09 0.63
N 21,940 21,940 21,968 21,968
N c l u s t e r 3 83 84 1 4 1
Panel B: County Level Crime Rates from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in crime rate from 1995 to 2000
Dependent Variable = Burglary Homicide Burglary Homicide
∆BankHI1992:1995 2.5076 -2.2819 5.5948 0.6431
(4.08) (-0.70) (2.16) (0.12)
Abortion rate1982:1986 -1.0510 -0.5596
(-5.05) (-2.12)
log(imprisonment rate)1994:1995 0.2838 0.2175
(2.44) (1.73)
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes No No
Adj. R
2 0.97 0.92 0.62 0.30
N 21,958 21,461 21,958 21,461
N c l u s t e r 3 93 83 9 3 8
44Table 8:
The Impact of State-Level Bank Branching Regulation on
Bank Concentration, Loan Activity, Prices, and Crime
Panel A employs commercial property transaction level data from COMPS from 1992 to 1999. Regressions of the level of
local bank concentration, loan rate, loan size, and capitalization rate of properties on the number of years since the state ﬁrst
allowed unrestricted branching (takes on the value zero if the state had yet to institute unrestricted branching at the time of
the property sale) are reported. Regressions include a constant, current crime risk (1995), recent growth in crime (from 1990
to 1995), recent growth in population, income, and home value, and property type ﬁxed eﬀects. Loan rate regressions also
include the loan attributes from Table 2. Coeﬃcient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported
with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the state and year level. Panel B employs state-level data on
crime rates (reported homicides and burglaries per 1,000 people) from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports from 1978 to 2001.
The year-to-year percentage changes in crime rates are regressed on a state level bank branching indicator which takes on
the value one if the state had adopted unrestricted branching within the last ﬁve years. Regressions also include a constant,
the one year lagged change in state population, employment, social services (the number of social service employees per
capita), income, and imprisonment rate (number of prisoners per capita), as well as the 16 year lagged change in the state
abortion rate (×1,000), which is the change in the number of abortions (16 years ago) per 1,000 live births. Cross-sectional
regressions across all 50 states plus the District of Columbia are run each year from 1978 to 2001 (1987 to 2001 when including
abortion rates) in the style of Fama and MacBeth (1973), where the time-series average of the yearly cross-sectional regression
coeﬃcient estimates are reported along with their time-series t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Transaction level loan activity and prices from COMPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable = Actual Loan rate Loan size Cap rate
BankHI (E/P)
Years of Unrestricted Branching -0.0006 -0.0152 0.0015 -0.0230
(-3.19) (-2.02) (4.25) (-3.37)
Price Variation -0.0074 0.0410 -0.0147 0.6660
(-2.24) (0.36) (-1.46) (5.97)
Population Growth 0.0002 0.0051 -0.0003 -0.0059
(1.78) (0.46) (-0.35) (-0.69)
Income Growth 0.0012 0.1401 -0.0001 -0.0499
(2.72) (1.34) (-0.66) (-0.40)
Home Value Growth 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001
(2.20) (-0.39) (-2.11)
N 22,317 6,267 16,131 10,070
N cluster 96 96 96 96
P a n e lB :S t a t el e v e lc h a n g e si nc r i m ea c r o s sa l l5 0s t a t e sf r o mt h eF B I
Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable = %∆Crimet %∆Homicidet %∆Homicidet %∆Burglaryt %∆Burglaryt
per 1,000 People (1978—2001) (1987—2001) (1978—2001) (1987—2001)
Post Unrestricted Branching Indicator -0.0094 -0.0143 -0.0150 -0.0100
(-0.87) (-1.39) (-3.48) (-3.40)
∆Populationt−1 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-0.53) (0.49) (-0.48) (-1.08)
∆Employmentt−1 5.5718 4.8934 0.7494 0.5595
(5.03) (5.39) (2.71) (2.12)
∆Social Servicest−1 -0.0070 -0.0056 -0.0029 -0.0042
(-4.21) (-5.72) (-6.25) (-9.36)
∆Incomet−1 -23.981 -14.509 -3.4942 2.8806
(-3.31) (-2.48) (-1.70) (2.32)
∆Imprisonment Ratet−1 -0.0261 -0.0106 0.0129 0.0088
(-1.29) (-1.09) (2.68) (2.35)
∆Abortion Ratet−16 -0.3173 -0.1007
(-5.75) (-6.08)
N (# years) 24 15 24 15
45Figure 1. Distribution of Predicted Change in Bank Concentration from Mergers of
Non-failing Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Companies with Assets Greater than
$1 Billion
The distribution of the predicted change in banking competitiveness measures through mergers of non-failing commercial bank
and bank holding companies with at least $1 billion in assets are plotted. The predicted change in banking competitiveness from










,w h e r eBankHIactual
j,yr is the actual
Herﬁndahl concentration index of commercial real estate bank loans within 15 miles of property j (excluding j itself) and
BankHI
merge
j,yr is the hypothetical concentration index assuming all non-failing commercial bank mergers took place at the
beginning of each year. The range of years used in calculating ∆BankHIyr1:yr2,j are 1992 to 1995, 1992 to saleyear,w h e r e
saleyear is the year in which the property transacted, and 1992 to 1999. The distribution and summary statistics for the entire
sample and only those where the predicted change in concentration is positive are reported.
Summary statisics
Mean Std. Dev. 75
th%9 0
th%M a x
∆BankHI1992:1995 0.0010 0.0028 0.0011 0.0040 0.0417
those > 0 0.0031 0.0040 0.0040 0.0043
∆BankHI1992:saleyear 0.0025 0.0050 0.0030 0.0060 0.0721
those > 0 0.0051 0.0061 0.0052 0.0123
∆BankHI1992:1999 0.0048 0.0068 0.0055 0.0167 0.0721
those > 0 0.0073 0.0072 0.0088 0.0179













4 Distribution for Entire Sample
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